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ABSTRACT
The judicial selection and retention provisions of the Alaska Constitution,
found in Article IV, achieve a delicate and remarkably successful balance
between competing interests. The purposes of this article are to describe this
constitutional plan (called “merit selection” because it begins with nomination
based on merit alone), explain why the founders adopted it, examine historical
challenges to it, and assess its performance on the 60th anniversary of Alaska
statehood.
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I. MERIT SELECTION OF JUDGES
A. Nomination by the Judicial Council
The process of judicial selection in Alaska begins with nomination
by the Judicial Council.1 The Council is a seven-member body, composed
of three lawyers chosen by the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar
Association; three public members appointed by the governor and
confirmed by the legislature; and the chief justice.2 The members of the
Council serve six-year terms, staggered to prevent a single governor or
Board of Governors from exercising excessive authority over the
Council’s composition.3 This first step in the judicial selection process
focuses on merit: Constitutional Convention delegate Ralph Rivers stated
that “the judicial council will seek for the best available timber” to send
to the governor.4 Delegate Frank Barr noted the attributes that the Council
would seek in a judge: “He should have in qualifications, first, ability and
experience. Secondly, he should have integrity and a willingness to
render impartial decisions.”5 The Council must nominate at least two6
applicants for the governor’s consideration.7

1. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 5.
2. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8. For an in-depth explanation of Alaska’s
system, see Antonia Moras, A Look at Judicial Selection in Alaska, 21 Alaska Justice
Forum #3: 1, 7–9.
3. Id. at 13.
4. Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention [hereinafter PACC],
at 594, available at http://www.akleg.gov/pdf/billfiles/Constitutional
Convention/Proceedings/Proceedings%20-%20Complete.pdf.
5. The Judicial Council has incorporated precisely these attributes in the
polling of attorneys that it conducts on all judicial applicants. Judicial Selection
Procedures, ALASKA JUD. COUNCIL, http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/selection/
procedures/procedures (last visited Aug. 28, 2018). The Council polls on
professional competence, integrity, fairness, temperament, and suitability of the
applicant’s legal experience for the position sought. Id.
6. The delegates debated whether the Council should be required to
nominate a greater number of applicants, but settled on two nominees in
recognition of Alaska’s small population of attorneys and the possible difficulty
of finding qualified candidates. PACC, supra note 4, at 585 (remarks of Delegate
McLaughlin) (“We figured because of the size of the Territory, initially it would
be preferable [to require only] two names.”). This has proven to be a well-founded
concern, especially in very sparsely populated rural areas. Twelve times since
1976 the Judicial Council, after advertising a vacancy, has been unable to forward
two names to the governor. E-mail from Susanne DiPietro, Exec. Dir., Alaska Jud.
Council, to the authors (August 27, 2018, 10:20 AKST) (on file with the authors).
On five occasions only one of the applicants was deemed qualified. Id. On three
occasions no applicants were deemed qualified. Id. On four occasions the
Council’s meeting was postponed because too few people applied. Id. In each
instance the Council was required to re-initiate the process. Id.
7. The Council’s bylaws, based on the record of the Constitutional
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B. Appointment by the Governor
The second phase of the selection process is appointment by the
governor, who is limited in his or her choice to those persons nominated
by the Judicial Council.8 An enduring concern of the majority of the
delegates was injecting politics into the selection of judges.9 At the same
time, the delegates recognized that the governor, as representative of the
people, should have an important role in the appointment process. As
delegate Ralph Rivers expressed it, in supporting the notion that the
governor should make the appointment (rather than, as proposed by
delegate Victor Rivers, the senate doing so), appointment by the governor
“is positive with some decency of approach and thinking the [J]udicial
[C]ouncil will seek for the best available timber, and we take a bow to the
governor in taking his choice of [the] persons that are nominated . . . .”10
Expressed another way, the delegates recognized that elections have
consequences. While ever vigilant against the politicization of the process
of selecting judges,11 they were prepared to give the governor the job of
selecting between those nominees who were the most highly qualified.

Convention, require it to “select two or more candidates who stand out as the
most qualified under the criteria set out in Article I, Section 1 of these bylaws.”
ALASKA JUD. COUNCIL, Bylaws, Article VII, § 4. Those criteria are the five listed in
note 5, above, plus these two: “judgment, including common sense,” and
“demonstrated commitment to public and community service.” Id.
8. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 5.
9. PACC, supra note 4, at 584 (statement of G. McLaughlin); PACC, supra
note 4, at 589 (statement of W.O. Smith); PACC, supra note 4, at 589 (statement of
W. Taylor); PACC, supra note 4, at 593–94 (statement of R. Rivers). In the Staff
Paper prepared by Public Administration Service for the Delegates to the Alaska
Constitutional Convention, found in Constitutional Studies, Alaska
Constitutional Convention, v. 2, the authors concluded their discussion of
selection methods with this observation:
Certainly the judge should be independent of political and personal
pressures. This concept of the independent judiciary is one of the truly
important features of American democratic government. How best to
obtain and retain that independence for the judges of the State of Alaska
is based in no small measure on the method of selecting judges which is
chosen by the Alaskan Constitution.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SERVICE, CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES: THE JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT, VOL 2, § VII, at 31 (1955).
10. PACC, supra note 4, at 594 (statement of R. Rivers).
11. As Delegate Edward V. Davis expressed the sentiment of the body:
“[W]ithout qualification, I believe I could say that all of us here want an
independent judiciary, a judiciary that will not be swayed by the public will at
any particular moment, a judiciary that will not be subject to political pressure, a
judiciary that will not be subject to pressure from the executive branch of the
government.” PACC, supra note 4, at 598 (statement of E. Davis).
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C. Retention (or Rejection) by the Electorate
The third phase in the merit selection process is the “democratic
check” provided by the retention election provisions of Section 6 of
Article IV.12 If the first phase of the selection process was to be based on
merit, and the second a recognition of the appropriate influence of
political considerations in the process, the third phase reflects the
founders’ belief that the electorate should play a role in determining
whether a judge should remain on the bench.
As the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, George
McLaughlin, stated during debate on the provision, “Roughly, three and
one-half or four years later, the judge is required, every judge without
exception, is required to go on the ballot for approval by the voters. . . .
The only requirement on a nonpartisan ballot could be, ‘Shall Judge Blank
be retained in office?’”13 Chairman McLaughlin noted that the plan
represented a compromise:
It is the best compromise and the best solution to a vexing
problem between those who feel we should have lifetime tenure
so the judges can be absolutely independent or whether we
should have a short term so the judges could be subject to the
popular will. The popular will should be expressed even in the
control of the judiciary, but the way to control it is to put the
judge on a nonpartisan ballot. . . . He is running against himself,
he is not running against someone else.14
The retention process is open, exhaustive, and invites public
participation. Alaskan voters have access to a truly impressive amount of
information in deciding whether to retain a judge. The Judicial Council
investigates the performance of every judge on the ballot, surveying every
lawyer in the state, as well as all police officers, social workers, court
employees, and jurors who have appeared in the judge’s court.15 The
Council also conducts public hearings16 and interviews litigants who have

12. “Each supreme court justice and superior court judge shall, in the manner
provided by law, be subject to approval or rejection on a nonpartisan ballot at the
first general election held more than three years after his appointment.” ALASKA
CONST. art. VI, § 6. The legislature subsequently provided for retention elections
for the legislatively-created district court, ALASKA STAT. § 22.07.070 (2016), and
court of appeals, ALASKA STAT. § 18.85.050 (2016).
13. PACC, supra note 4, at 586 (statement of G. McLaughlin).
14. Id.
15. Retention Evaluation Procedures, ALASKA JUD. COUNCIL, http://www.ajc.
state.ak.us/evaluating-judges/retention-evaluation-procedures (last visited Aug.
28, 2018).
16. Id.
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been in the judge’s court.17 Further, the Council analyzes the affirmance
rates for trial judges18 and the number of times the judge is pre-empted
from hearing cases.19 Moreover, the Council examines the judge’s
timeliness in rendering decisions20 and, in appropriate cases, the Council
interviews the judge standing for retention.21 Finally, the Council goes to
great lengths to publicize all of the information obtained.22 At the end of
this process, the Council votes, in open session, to recommend to the
voters either to retain or not to retain the judge.23
Following the first retention election for an individual judge, the
judge must stand again for retention on a schedule determined by the
judge’s level of court: every four years for district court,24 every six years
for superior court,25 every eight years for the court of appeals,26 and every
10 years for the supreme court.27
To summarize, Alaska’s merit selection and retention system is a
three-part process: First, the Judicial Council nominates two or more
judicial candidates on the basis of merit by considering their professional
competence, integrity, fairness, temperament, suitability of experience,
judgment and common sense, and demonstrated commitment to public
service. Next, the governor appoints from the list of those nominated,
presumably choosing the appointee who best meets the governor’s
criteria for judicial excellence. Finally, after two or three years, the voters
determine whether the judge will remain on the bench.

II. WHY THE FOUNDERS ADOPTED A MERIT-BASED SELECTION
SYSTEM
When Alaska’s Constitutional Convention convened on November
8, 1955, the delegates on the Judiciary Committee enjoyed unique freedom
to shape Alaska’s judicial system. The Second Organic Act—which
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. The Judicial Council “widely publicizes the evaluation process through
frequent press releases, personal contacts with radio and television stations,
speeches to public groups such as community councils and feature articles in
newspapers.” Id.
23. Frequently Asked Questions About Retention, ALASKA JUD. COUNCIL,
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/retention/faq (last visited Aug. 28, 2018). The
council is not obligated to make recommendations, but it has always done so.
24. ALASKA STAT. § 15.35.100 (2016).
25. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 6.
26. ALASKA STAT. § 15.35.053 (2016).
27. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 6.
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formally organized the Territory of Alaska—did not allow Alaska to
create its own territorial courts.28 Thus, Alaska was, prior to statehood,
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.29 With no territorial
infrastructure upon which to build Alaska’s judiciary, the Committee
members looked to other states’ experiments with judicial systems to
guide their drafting of Article IV, drawing upon nearly two centuries of
state and federal experience in judicial selection.30
The Committee members “did not want to experiment” with new,
radical proposals to structure the judiciary in drafting Article IV.31 The
Committee wanted to build upon a system “that had precedent and that
worked.”32 Thus, the Committee examined already-functioning judicial
selection systems to strike an appropriate balance between independence
from the political branches and accountability to the people.33 Indeed,
delegates to the Constitutional Convention were uniformly concerned
that party politics or special interests might pollute Alaska’s judiciary.34
Though the delegates overwhelmingly supported a system where judges
were appointed, rather than elected, a small minority of delegates
believed judicial elections were the best way to keep politics off the
bench.35 Moreover, the delegates briefly debated having the governor or
other elected representatives initially select the nominees, instead of a

28. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 387, 37 Stat. 512.
29. See JOHN S. WHITEHEAD, COMPLETING THE UNION 128 (2004) (“The
[T]erritory [of Alaska] could not create its own territorial courts. Thus all
territorial laws would be adjudicated in the existing federal courts.”).
30. It is worth noting, however, that while Alaska’s judiciary mirrors meritbased selection systems from other states, Alaska was actually the first state to
adopt merit selection for all its courts. JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S
COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 224 (Harvard Univ. Press
2012).
31. PACC, supra note 4, at 588 (statement of G. McLaughlin). While the
Judiciary Committee was not formally or legally bound to any particular judicial
model, the Alaska Bar Association’s Statehood Committee put forward its case for
judicial independence when it called for a convention, citing a merit-based
selection system as a model. Thomas B. Stewart, A Model Judiciary for the 49th State,
42 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 52 (1958); SHUGERMAN, supra note 30, at 224.
32. SHUGERMAN, supra note 30, at 224.
33. See VICTOR FISCHER, ALASKA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 113–16
(1975).
34. PACC, supra note 4, at 596 (statement of R. Rivers) (“All agree that the
first step is to find the right method of selecting judges which will insure a bench
free from the influence and control of party politics, individuals or pressure
groups.”); PACC, supra note 4, at 598 (statement of E. Davis) (“[W]ithout
qualification, I believe I could say that all of us here want an independent
judiciary, a judiciary that will not be swayed by the public will at any particular
moment, a judiciary that will not be subject to political pressure, a judiciary that
will not be subject to pressure from the executive branch of the government.”).
35. PACC, supra note 4, at 597 (statement of E. Davis).
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judicial council performing that function.36 How the delegates navigated
this disagreement and arrived at the merit selection process is explored in
detail below.
A. Debates at the Constitutional Convention
How the delegates came to design the merit selection process can be
divided into two questions. First, why did the delegates choose
appointment over election? And second, why did the delegates task a
judicial council with sending a list of candidates to the governor, instead
of allowing the governor to initially select the candidates? These
questions are answered by the delegates’ desire to establish a judiciary
“independen[t] from the executive and legislative branches”—a judiciary
removed from the tumult and vicissitudes of politics.37
1. Appointment Versus Election
The Judiciary Committee first looked to experienced professionals in
the legal community when weighing an appointment system against an
election system.38 They quickly agreed to follow principles suggested by
the American Bar Association and other professional civic groups, which
heavily favored appointment.39 Moreover, before presenting a draft of the
article to the entire Convention for debate, Committee Chairman George
McLaughlin sought advice and comment from the Alaska Bar
Association, federal district court judges, the U.S. Attorney for the
Territory of Alaska, and the United States Commissioner in Alaska.40 This
36. See, e.g., About the Commission on Judicial Appointments, CAL. CTS.
http://www.courts.ca.gov/5367.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2018) (describing
California’s process for filling a vacancy in either the state supreme court or court
of appeals, where justices are appointed by the governor and the Commission on
Judicial Appointments possesses the ultimate discretion in confirming those
appointments).
37. FISCHER, supra note 33, at 113.
38. Id. at 269–75. The Committee’s makeup—five lawyers and two nonlawyers—may partially explain its determination that the views of experienced
professionals in the legal community were entitled to weight. Id. At the same time,
less than twenty-five percent of the convention delegates (thirteen of fifty-five)
were lawyers. Id.
39. FISCHER, supra note 33, at 113. The American Bar Association and
American Judicature Society both formally endorsed in the late 1930s a
commission-based appointment system that became the basis for the merit
selection system Alaska has today. See Glenn R. Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial
Selection and Tenure: Its Historical Development, in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL
SELECTION AND TENURE, 29, 37 (Glenn R. Winters ed., rev. ed. 1973); see also
SHUGERMAN, supra note 30 at 202–05 (exploring the historical roots of commissionbased appointment systems in the United States).
40. FISCHER, supra note 33, at 114.
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process led to many endorsements of the appointment system, including
one from the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar Association.41
Ultimately, Chairman McLaughlin and the rest of the Committee
presented to the entire Convention a judiciary article that included a nonpartisan plan for selecting judges that would “make judges responsible to
the people without subjecting them to the partisan politics or competitive
campaigns for election or re-election.”42
The proposed judiciary article included a merit-based appointment
system first adopted by Missouri in the 1940s.43 Under the Missouri Plan,
judges were initially appointed by the governor, who selected from a list
of three nominees recommended by a judicial commission.44 At the first
general election following the judge’s first year on the bench, he or she
would face the voters in a retention election.45 Judges who received
affirmative votes in this uncontested retention election of a majority of the
votes cast earned a full six-year term in office if a trial judge or a twelveyear term if an appellate judge.46 While substantially similar to the
Missouri Plan, Alaska’s judicial selection system allows more time—at
least three years for most judges47—between a judge’s initial appointment
to the bench and the first retention election.
Delegates at the Convention almost uniformly preferred an
appointment system to judicial elections,48 though there was a small,
vocal minority advocating for the latter.49 Broadly speaking, the delegates
preferred appointment because they feared that judicial elections would
make the judiciary less independent and would potentially lead judges to
decide cases based, at least in part, on political considerations.50 The

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Norman Krivosha, In Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of Merit
Selection, 74 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 128, 131 (1990). California in 1934 became the
first state to adopt an appointment system that considered input from the state’s
community of lawyers and judges. Id. But Missouri was the first state to
implement a system in which a council or committee of attorneys made the initial
selection of judicial candidates. Id; see also Hon. Jay A. Daugherty, The Missouri
Non-Partisan Court Plan: a Dinosaur on the Edge of Extinction or a Survivor in a
Changing Socio-Legal Environment?, 62 MO. L. REV. 315, 319 (1997).
44. Daugherty, supra note 43, at 319.
45. Id.
46. Id; see also MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(c)(1).
47. For district court judges, the period is at least two years. ALASKA STAT. §
15.35.100 (2016).
48. FISCHER, supra note 33, at 115.
49. Id. (explaining that Robert McNealy, a delegate from Fairbanks, proposed
an amendment to the judiciary article that would have substituted judicial
elections for the Missouri Plan).
50. See SHUGERMAN, supra note 30, at 224–25 (“Alaskan voters were solidly
Democratic [in the 1950s], and, at the time, Eisenhower was president and
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delegates to the Convention were concerned that elections would force
judges to take into account the political effects of their decisions and
modify those decisions accordingly. As McLaughlin put it, judges who
were worried about election results would be constantly “peering over
[their] shoulders to see if [their] decisions were popular.”51 Second, the
delegates were concerned that litigants might not have their claims
adjudicated fairly before an elected judiciary.52
These concerns steered the delegates away from judicial elections.
But the delegates still desired some degree of popular control over the
composition of the bench and believed that “[t]he popular will should be
expressed even in the control of the judiciary.”53 Thus, the Committee
ultimately decided that judges’ names should be placed before the people
on a nonpartisan ballot “at the first general election held more than three
years after his appointment.”54 This compromise was, in the eyes of
Chairman McLaughlin, “the best solution to a vexing problem between
those who feel we should have lifetime tenure so the judges can be
absolutely independent or whether we should have short terms so the
judges could be subject to popular will.”55
McLaughlin was not willing, however, to endorse the Missouri
Plan’s short period of time between the initial appointment of a judge and
the first retention election.56 Echoing his earlier concern that elected
judges may be constantly “looking over their shoulder”57 to gauge the
popularity of their decisions, McLaughlin explained,
the only way we could assure the attraction of good candidates
was to assure them they would be in office at least for a period
of three and one-half years. Why is that necessary? Because after
a year and one-half a judge might make a very unpopular
decision, and he would not be able to overcome that in terms of
popular resentment, and he might be forced out of office after a
year and one-half.58
McLaughlin believed that holding retention elections a minimum of
three years after appointment would capture the benefits of an
Republicans controlled the Senate . . . . Alaskan leaders understood that
nonpartisan appointment was a public statement to a national audience and to
Republicans that Alaskans intended to govern responsibly with
nonpartisanship.”).
51. PACC, supra note 4, at 584 (statement of G. McLaughlin).
52. Id. at 601 (statement of L. Barr).
53. Id. at 586 (statement of G. McLaughlin).
54. ALASKA CONST. art. IV § 6.
55. PACC, supra note 4, at 601 (statement of G. McLaughlin).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 584 (statement of G. McLaughlin).
58. Id. at 586.
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independent judiciary while still allowing the people to have their say in
who gets to be a judge.59
Committee members also believed the Missouri Plan would produce
the most well-qualified candidates for the bench. Ketchikan delegate
Walter Smith, for example, thought that while “political implications
would be equal” in either an appointment or elective system, “under an
elective system a man is elected on his personal charm or his popularity
and quite often his qualifications are not closely examined.”60 Fairbanks
delegate Ralph Rivers echoed Smith’s belief, arguing that elections would
turn away otherwise qualified candidates for judgeships because they
would hesitate to join the “political circus” of judicial elections.61
McLaughlin also concurred with Smith and emphasized that the
attorneys on the Judicial Council would assure the most-qualified
candidates are sent to the governor for final approval.62
The appointment system was not without its detractors. Fairbanks
delegate and attorney Robert McNealy strongly preferred an election
system to appointment. He believed that the latter fomented “much
greater political interference and corruption.”63 McNealy, who had lived
in Alaska nearly 20 years at the time of the Convention, expressed his
personal frustration with an appointment system, stating that “Being an
attorney, I know the background of the appointment system of judges.
Being an Alaskan I have lived under the appointment system so long that
I feel that I should have the right to vote for these judges.”64 McNealy’s
substantive arguments, however, are somewhat difficult to decipher
because he often advocated his positions by articulating long and, at
times, confusing hypotheticals rather than stating his arguments
directly.65

59. At least one legal scholar has argued that retention elections soon after
appointment are undesirable. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Evaluating Judicial
Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1985, 1989 (1988) (“Another problem that needs to be
addressed has to do with the frequency of retention elections in California.
Although judges have twelve-year terms in California, they face retention
elections in the first general election after their appointment.”).
60. PACC, supra note 4, at 589 (statement of W. Smith).
61. Id. at 593–94 (statement of R. Rivers).
62. Id. at 687 (statement of G. McLaughlin).
63. FISCHER, supra note 33, at 115.
64. PACC, supra note 4, at 583 (statement of R. McNealy).
65. See discussion infra Section II.A.2; see also PACC, supra note 4, at 592 (using
the fictional “Judge Whoozit” in a hypothetical wherein lawyers in Alaska band
together in an attempt to discredit a deficient judge—McNealy was using this
hypothetical to claim that the general public would not be swayed by such an
attempt because “Judge Whoozit” would be able to convince them that the
lawyers were trying to sabotage him).
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A careful dissection of McNealy’s Convention speeches reveals two
principled concerns with merit-selection: (1) Absent a political opponent,
judges adept in political communication and self-promotion will always
win their retention elections. Thus, even deficient judges will remain on
the bench indefinitely. (2) Members of an appointed Judicial Council will
be necessarily beholden to the political interests of the body that
appointed them.66 The lay members of the Council will be an arm of the
governor, whereas the three attorney members will reflect the wishes of
the Alaska Bar Association because “lawyers have politics, too.”67 As an
examination of subsequent history reveals, neither argument has proven
correct.68
McNealy’s first argument was premised on the belief that “the
general public does not pay too much attention to judges and what is
going on in court unless it is your case before the court.”69 He went on to
say that if a judge issued poor decisions, then that judge would still win
any retention election because the judge would only have to run against
his or her record—as opposed to an opponent—and the only people
voting against that judge would be legal professionals with the time and
education to understand why the judge’s decisions were deficient.70
This argument is not entirely without theoretical merit. Many
scholars—some in Alaska—argue that retention elections encourage a
“yes” vote because the judge has the advantage of incumbency and voters
do not have an alternative judicial candidate to support.71 Indeed,
acknowledging that the public may have difficulty in assessing a judge’s
66. See PACC, supra note 4, at 590–93 (statement of R. McNealy).
67. PACC, supra note 4, at 2884 (statement of R. McNealy); see also
SHUGERMAN, supra note 30, at 226 (“One theory suggests that merit selection was
the product of powerful state bar associations, but this theory certainly does not
apply to Alaska. The Alaska bar did not even exist in any organized way until the
state constitutional convention was announced.”).
68. As to the notion that opposition by the organized bar would guarantee
that a judge up for retention would win, see supra note 65. As to the notion that
appointees would always reflect the views of the entity that appointed them, and
that 3-3 votes would routinely result, see infra note 73.
69. PACC, supra note 4, at 591 (statement of R. McNealy).
70. See id.
71. See GORDON HARRISON, ALASKA LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY, ALASKA’S
CONSTITUTION: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 98 (5th ed. 2012), available at
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/Portals/4/pub/AK%20CONSTITUTI
ON-Citizens%27%20Guide.pdf; Chris W. Bonneau, Electoral Verdicts: Incumbent
Defeats in State Supreme Court Elections, 33 AM. POL. RES. 818 (2005); THOMAS
MOREHOUSE AND GERALD MCBEATH, ALASKA POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 200 (Univ.
of Neb. Press 1994) (“The removal of only a handful of judges typically occurs
with the kind of retention election Alaska uses. The elections do not present voters
with a choice between candidates. If a judge is not retained, the people have little
say about the replacement. Foes of a certain judge must be organized and wellfunded to mobilize opposition among the electorate.”).
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performance (and mindful of a judge’s vulnerability to last-minute smear
campaigns) without readily-accessible evaluative data, the Alaska State
Legislature in 1975 directed the Judicial Council to evaluate judges
standing for retention elections and publish the results prior to the
election.72 And while several judges have been retained by the voters
despite a non-retention recommendation by the Council, all but one judge
rejected by the voters after 1975 received a non-retention
recommendation from the Council.73
McNealy’s second argument was that Council members would be
mere pawns of the entity that appointed them: lay persons on the Judicial
Council appointed by the governor would, according to McNealy, merely
be instruments of the governor’s political party and lawyers would
represent only the Bar.74 McNealy also suggested that such a deadlock
could block formation of the Council itself if agreement on nominees for
chief justice could not be reached.75 Of course, this argument loses its force

72. ALASKA STAT. § 15.58.050 (2016) (“. . .the Judicial Council shall file with
the lieutenant governor a statement including information about each supreme
court justice, court of appeals judge, superior court judge, and district court judge
who will be subject to a retention election. The statement shall reflect the
evaluation of each justice or judge conducted by the Judicial Council according to
law and shall contain a brief statement describing each public reprimand, public
censure, or suspension received by the judge. . . .”); HARRISON, supra note 71, at
101 (“To evaluate the fitness of judges for retention, the Council surveys attorneys,
police officers, probation officers, jurors, social workers, and court employees; it
studies decisions of the judge and pertinent court records; and it solicits citizens’
opinions through public hearings and other means. The Council must publicize
the results of its evaluations at least 60 days before the retention election. It does
so by publishing them in newspapers around the state and in the official election
pamphlet distributed to voters by the division of elections.”).
73. See ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS,
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/retention/faq (last visited Aug. 28, 2018) (“Since
1976, the Judicial Council has recommended against a judge’s retention twelve
times.”); see also ALASKA JUD. COUNCIL, 1976-2016 RETENTION VOTE HISTORY (2016),
available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/sites/default/files/imported/retention/
retvotes16.pdf (showing two judges were removed in 1982, one in 2006, and one
in 2010). As this article was being finalized for publication, Anchorage Superior
Court Judge Michael Corey lost his 2018 retention election despite receiving a
recommendation from the Judicial Council that he be retained. Michelle Theriault
Boots, Voters Oust Anchorage Judge Targeted for Role in Controversial Plea Agreement,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.adn.com/alaskanews/2018/11/06/anchorage-judge-targeted-for-role-in-controversial-pleaagreement-trailing/. Corey was the target of a grassroots campaign to remove
him from the bench after he accepted a controversial plea agreement. Id. This was
the first time in Alaska’s history that a judge lost his or her retention election after
receiving a positive recommendation from the Council, and it was also the first
time a judge was voted off the bench in response to public outrage over a specific
judicial decision. Id.
74. See PACC, supra note 4, at 592 (statement of R. McNealy).
75. See id. at 592–93.
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when considering that, once the first Chief Justice of the Alaska Supreme
Court was appointed, the chief would serve as an ex-officio member of the
Council and be able to provide the tie-breaking vote. Delegate Ralph
Rivers pointed out as much during the Convention:
There is the other point that there will only be six until a supreme
court justice is appointed and the only chance for a deadlock
would be on nominating two or three people for the office of
supreme court justice. After that you have your seventh member
and there will be no chance of a deadlock. I am willing to trust
the integrity and good sense of the six people first appointed to
judicial council to be able to agree on two or three nominations
for chief justice, and I am willing to trust the governor to take his
choice of those two or three names that are presented, so I see no
serious problem of a deadlock in order to get the machinery fully
implemented.76
McNealy was unable to persuade more than a handful of delegates
at the Convention to support an election system. After the proposed
Judiciary Article’s first reading, the modified Missouri Plan passed by a
fifty-one to two vote.77 W.W. Laws was the only delegate to join
McNealy’s protest.78 He did so without joining the debate. McNealy again
opposed the Article IV proposal in its third reading.79 His arguments
remained largely the same.80 McNealy saw the lay members and attorneys
on the Judicial Council as pawns in a political chess match between the
Alaska Bar Association and the governor.81 And the Chief Justice of the
Alaska Supreme Court would be the proverbial queen: if the governor
“can control the chief justice and the three laymen, he makes all the
appointments; if the bar association can control the chief justice and the
three lawyers on this Judicial Council, they are going to make all the
appointments.”82 This argument was able to win over a few converts to

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

PACC, supra note 4, at 594 (statement of R. Rivers).
PACC, supra note 4, at 610 (vote roll call).
FISCHER, supra note 33, at 115.
Id.
See id; PACC, supra note 4, at 2882-84 (statement of R. McNealy).
PACC, supra note 4, at 2884.
PACC, supra note 4, at 2884 (statement of R. McNealy).
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McNealy’s corner, though his fight was ultimately futile.83 The final
Judiciary Article was approved by a vote of forty-seven to six.84
2. Appointment by the Judicial Council Versus Political Appointment
The delegates to Alaska’s Constitutional Convention were uniformly
skeptical of the governor’s role in appointing judges.85 Chairman
McLaughlin pointed to California as a state that suffered from a broken
judicial system precisely because the California judicial commission
would consider candidates only if they had already been selected by the
governor.86 He stated at the Convention that “there was a tendency [in
California] on the part of the governor to always pick men of his own
political party . . . [and] just present [the Council] with a long line of
Democrats or a long line of Republicans.”87 Thus, McLaughlin was
concerned that even if the governor was unable to appoint the individual
judges he or she wanted, they could at least ensure that any newlyappointed judge carried the banner of the governor’s party.
McNealy was also skeptical of allowing the governor to appoint
judges.88 As mentioned above, McNealy was against any appointment
system—he preferred elections.89 He seemed especially concerned,
however, about the governor’s political motivations in selecting judges.90
When he realized that, no matter how much he protested, the Council
would be a feature of Alaska’s judiciary, McNealy admitted that “in my
opinion four lawyers should be able to control this judicial council.”91
McNealy, however, did not consider the ex-officio membership of the chief

83. Moreover, the 60-year history of the Council has definitively consigned
McNealy’s speculation to the dustbin: Of 1,344 Council votes on judicial selection
since 1984, when detailed records have been kept, there have been only 73 ties,
requiring the chief justice to cast a vote. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, DETAILS OF
JUDICIAL NOMINATION VOTES 1984-2018 (2018) (on file with authors). Of those 73
ties, the three attorneys and the three non-lawyers were on opposite sides of the
vote only 18 times, or 1.3% of the total votes. Id. In those cases, the chief justice
voted to forward the applicant in question to the governor nine times, and to not
forward the applicant nine times. Id. Of those 1,344 votes, the Council was
unanimous on 876 votes, and unanimous but for one on 235 votes, for a total of
82.6% unanimous or unanimous-but-for-one. Id.
84. PACC, supra note 4, at 2881–85 (statement of R. McNealy and vote roll
call); see also FISCHER, supra note 33, at 115.
85. See, e.g., PACC, supra note 4, at 584 (statement of G. McLaughlin).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 583–84.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 585–86
91. PACC, supra note 4, 2884 (statement of R. McNealy).
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justice in his count, explaining that the “chief justice is going to owe his
appointment to the governor.”92
At least one delegate suggested skipping the governor altogether
and having the Council send a list of nominees directly to the senate for
approval.93 Ralph Rivers pointed out that, because the chief justice would
preside over any attempt at impeaching the governor, it might be best to
“submit the recommendation [from the Council] directly to the senate.”94
Rivers explained that “there might be a conflict of interests if these
supreme court judges were called to sit upon the trial of a man whom they
had received their appointment from.”95
The Committee “did consider the possibility” that the Council be
allowed to send candidates directly to the senate for confirmation.96 But
the Committee ultimately determined—at the “insistence” of either
Thomas Harris or Irwin Metcalf, the two non-lawyers on the
Committee—that such a system would be “too much of a closed
corporation” and thus desired “some participation by the executive.”97
Moreover, as mentioned above, McLaughlin was hesitant to experiment
with novel, untested systems of judicial appointment.98 He argued that no
conflict of interest between the chief justice and the governor had been
identified in any state that followed some version of the Missouri Plan.99
McLaughlin assured Rivers that the Committee had applied the best
practices available by examining judicial systems throughout the country
and, should problems arise, the people of Alaska “will attempt to solve
them.”100
3. The Convention Consultants’ Memorandum
As a final historical note, it is worth mentioning the input from the
Convention consultants.101 While the consultants agreed with the basic
92. Id.
93. Id. at 587–88 (statement of R. Rivers).
94. Id. at 588 (statement of R. Rivers).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 588 (statement of G. McLaughlin).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 588–89 (statement of G. McLaughlin).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. A group of consultants—experts and academics in the fields of public
administration and political science—assisted the various constitutional
committees. FISCHER, supra note 33, at 41. Through these consultants, “delegates
obtained the advice of the most widely recognized national authorities on state
and local government and were able to learn first-hand about the problems that
faced those states with older constitutions.” Id. Consultants to the Judiciary
Committee included John Bebout, the Assistant Director of the National
Municipal League; James Kimbraugh Owen, the Director of both the Public
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objectives of the proposed judiciary article, they also stated in their
memorandum that “[n]o state constitution has ever gone this far in
placing one of the three coordinate branches of government beyond the
reach of democratic controls.”102 The consultants suggested revisions that
would, in their view, democratize the process and loosen the grasp of the
Alaska Bar Association.103 These revisions included legislative
confirmation of attorney members of the Judicial Council and adding a
superior court judge and another lay member to the Council.104
These suggestions, however, were never debated on the Convention
floor.105 The Convention had an unwritten rule that the views of the
consultants would not be cited during debate on the floor.106 The
delegates followed this practice to avoid any public criticism that
“outsiders” were writing the Alaska Constitution.107 If a consultant had a
serious concern or disagreement with a committee or Convention action,
he or she would typically communicate this concern to the committee
chairman or meet privately with individual delegates.108 The consultants
to the Judiciary Committee did, in fact, bring the above-stated concerns
to George McLaughlin in the form of a memo.109 McLaughlin rejected
these suggestions, however, and declined to raise them in any of the
debates on the Convention floor.110

III. CHALLENGES TO MERIT SELECTION
Attempts to replace merit selection with different, more politicized,
systems for selection of judges have periodically been made. For example,
even though the Alaska Constitution requires the governor to appoint
from the list of two or more nominees sent by the Judicial Council,111 and
even though discussion at the Constitutional Convention made clear that

Affairs Research Council of Louisiana and the Louisiana State Law Institute’s
Constitutional Revision Project; and Emil J. Sady, the Resident Consultant of the
Alaska Constitutional Convention and Senior Board Member of the Government
Studies Division at the Brookings Institute. Id.
102. FISCHER, supra note 33, at 116.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 42.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. ALASKA CONST., art. IV, § 5 (“The governor shall fill any vacancy . . . by
appointing one of two or more persons nominated by the Judicial Council.”
(emphasis added)).
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the governor “has no other choice,”112 governors have at times threatened
not to appoint from the list of those nominated by the Judicial Council,
variously requesting or demanding more names, in effect attempting to
bypass the first, merit-based, stage of the process.113 No such efforts have
been successful.
More seriously, litigants have challenged merit selection as violating
the U.S. Constitution and state legislators have attempted to amend the
Alaska Constitution to seriously weaken merit selection. To date, neither
judicial nor legislative attacks have succeeded. But both lines of attack
deserve careful consideration because of their potential to do real harm to
the concept of merit selection.
A. Litigation-based Challenges to Article IV
In 2009, James Bopp, Jr., who would later be recognized as the
architect of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,114 sued to
invalidate Article IV on federal equal protection grounds.115 In Miller v.
Carpeneti,116 the plaintiffs argued that Article IV’s reliance on attorney-

112. See PACC, supra note 4, at 585 Id. (Statement of G. McLaughlin). As
Chairman McLaughlin stated: “The governor is presented with two names, two
or more names. . . . The governor has no other choice, of the two names presented,
he takes one, fills the vacancy in the court.” (Statement of G. McLaughlin).
113. In probably the most serious case, Gov. Frank Murkowski in 2004 wrote
to the Judicial Council rejecting all nominees for a vacant superior court position
in Anchorage. Letter from Frank Murkowski, Governor of Alaska, to Larry Cohn,
Exec. Dir., Alaska Judicial Council (Aug. 26, 2004) (on file with the Alaska Judicial
Council) (“After careful consideration I have decided to reject the three candidates
you have proposed.”); Sheila Toomey, Governor Nixes Judge Candidates,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 31, 2004, at A1; see also Sheila Toomey, Rejection of
Judge List Is “No Crisis”, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 3, 2004, at B1; Sheila
Toomey, Judicial Council Given Ultimatum Over Bylaws, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 4, 2004, at A1; Anchorage Daily News Staff, Murkowski Overreaches,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 5, 2004, at H2; Kevin Clarkson, Truth Lies in Middle
on Judge Selection, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 15, 2004, at B6; and following a
meeting between the members of the Judicial Council and the governor’s chief of
staff, the governor retreated from his original letter rejecting all nominees and
appointed one of the nominees sent by the Council. Nicole Tsong, Judgeship
Appointment Issue Still Alive in Court, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 29, 2005, at B2.
114. Bopp’s role in Citizens United has been chronicled widely in the press. See,
e.g., Sarah Childress, James Bopp: What Citizens United Means for Campaign Finance,
Frontline (Oct. 12, 2012), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/jamesbopp-what-citizens-united-means-for-campaign-finance/ (referring to Bopp as
“the intellectual architect behind Citizens United”).
115. Miller v. Carpeneti, No. 3:09-CV-00136-JWS, 2009 WL 10695976, at *1 (D.
Alaska Sept. 15, 2009).
116. Id.
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members of the Judicial Council violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the U.S. Constitution because non-attorneys were denied the right to vote
in the selection process for judges.117
Relying on United States Supreme Court cases establishing the “one
person, one vote” principle, and lower court decisions applying the
principle to state and municipal elections, plaintiffs argued that the
Alaska judicial selection process violated equal protection because of
differences in the ways the participants in the process were themselves
selected.118 That is, while the governor who appointed judges went before
all the voters,119 and the legislators who confirmed the non-attorney
members of the Judicial Council went before all the voters,120 and even
the chief justice went before all the voters in his or her retention
election,121 the attorney members of the Judicial Council obtained their
positions through appointment by the Bar Association’s board of
governors, themselves elected only by members of the Bar Association
and not by all Alaska voters.122
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action, arguing that plaintiffs’ cases (and thus their theory) were
inapposite primarily because Alaska’s constitutional scheme for judicial
selection did not involve an election: “[P]laintiffs now contend that the
constitutional selection process denies non-attorneys an equal right to
vote for judges. Plaintiffs’ claim fails principally because there is no
election to select Alaska’s judges.”123 Defendants also argued that even if
the merit selection process were elective in nature, one person, one vote
does not apply to the judicial branch because judges do not represent the
people.124 Alternatively, defendants argued that election to the Board of
Governors fell within the limited purpose election exception to the one
person, one vote rule.125
The federal district court agreed with the defendants and granted the
motion to dismiss.126 It began with the observation that “[o]f course,
Alaska judges are not selected in an election. This forces plaintiffs to
contend [one person, one vote] applies even where the state has chosen to
117. Id. at *7–9.
118. Id. at *8.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion To Dismiss at 2, Miller
v. Carpeneti, No. 3:09-cv-00136-JWS, 2009 WL 10695976 (D. Alaska Sept. 15, 2009).
124. Id. at *11.
125. Id. at *19.
126. See Miller v. Carpeneti, No. 3:09-CV-00136-JWS, 2009 WL 10695976 (D.
Alaska Sept. 15, 2009).
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select judges by appointment.”127 For this reason, the one person, one vote
principle did not directly apply.
The district court also rejected plaintiffs’ claim on the separate
ground that one person, one vote did not apply to the election of the
members of the Board of Governors “because the Board’s activities
generally fall within the limited purpose exception.”128 It reached this
conclusion because the Board exercised only narrow, limited
governmental powers and it conducted activities that disproportionately
affected only a specific group of individuals—here, lawyers.129 Because
the Board was a limited purpose entity, the franchise could be
constitutionally limited to lawyers, a group of individuals who are
disproportionately affected, so long as the decision is reasonable and
bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. The court
concluded that “[t]he Plan reflects the entirely rational proposition [that]
lawyers have the experience and expertise needed to select Council
members from among the ranks of Alaska’s lawyers. Furthermore, the
interest in selecting qualified persons to serve on the Board is a
legitimate—indeed very important—interest.”130 For these reasons the
district court concluded that the election of lawyers to the Board of
Governors passed constitutional muster.131
Finally, the court reviewed whether the Board’s selection of the
attorney members of the Judicial Council violated equal protection. It did
not, the court held, because one person, one vote “does not apply where
non-legislative officers are chosen by appointment, rather than by
election.”132 Moreover, even if that principle applied, the Council itself is
a limited purpose entity and it qualifies for the limited purpose exception
to the one person, one vote principle.133
Plaintiffs appealed the decision of the district court to the Ninth
Circuit.134 That court affirmed in a unanimous decision which began by
noting that “the district court correctly concluded [that] the right to equal
voting participation has no application to the Judicial Council because the

127. Id. at *1.
128. Id. at *19. The limited purpose entity exception is based on the Supreme
Court’s determination that the one person, one vote principle does not apply to
the election of an entity that (1) exercises only limited governmental powers and
(2) conducts activities that disproportionately affect only a specific group of
individuals. E.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 364 (1981).
129. Miller, 2009 WL 10695976, at *19.
130. Id. at *20.
131. Id. at *20–21.
132. Id. at *21.
133. Id. at *22.
134. Kirk v. Carpeneti, 623 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 2010).
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members of the Council are appointed, rather than elected.”135 The court
then directly addressed plaintiffs’ “novel argument that all participants
in Alaska’s judicial selection process must either be elected themselves, or
be appointed by a popularly elected official.”136 Noting that plaintiffs’
sole support for that proposition was “thin,” the court nonetheless
proceeded to address it comprehensively.137
Plaintiffs relied on a footnote in Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No.
15,138 in which a New York resident challenged a statute that limited
voting in certain school board elections to property owners, leaseholders,
and parents with children enrolled in the public schools. The Court struck
down the statute in Kramer, applying strict scrutiny, because its
restrictions impermissibly denied citizens with a legitimate interest in
school affairs the right to vote in school board elections.139 In its analysis,
the Court noted the difference between elective and appointive
systems.140 In the latter, the Court stated that a voter had “indirect”
influence over an appointment by virtue of voting for the appointing
official: “Each resident’s formal influence is perhaps indirect, but it is
equal to that of other residents.”141 But in an elective system, there was no
influence exercised by those voters who were disqualified from voting.142
Plaintiffs used the quoted footnote to argue that the appointment
power must be limited to officials who have been elected.143 The Ninth
Circuit directly rejected that theory:
Plaintiffs attempt to characterize Kramer, and particularly the
footnote 7 sentence referring to equal indirect influence in
appointments, as holding that the Equal Protection Clause
requires limiting the appointment power to officials who have
been popularly elected. . . . The Kramer footnote does not stand
for any such proposition. . . . The Court did not suggest a
sweeping new constitutional rule that appointments for all
positions in every branch of government must be made by an
official who is popularly elected.144
The court went on to note that fourteen states besides Alaska “give
a significant role to attorneys in the merit selection process,” using
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 898.
Id.
Id.
395 U.S. 621 (1969).
Id. at 630–32.
Id. at 627 n.7.
Id.
Id.
Kirk, 623 F.3d at 907.
Id. at 899.
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nominating commissions that include attorney members who are neither
popularly elected nor appointed by a popularly-elected official.145 And it
pointed out that federal magistrate judges and federal bankruptcy judges
are appointed after nomination by merit selection panels that are not
popularly elected.146
Having decided that the district court had properly resolved the
constitutional issues raised by the case, the Ninth Circuit concluded its
discussion with the observation that the pros and cons of the merit
selection of judges, and the pros and cons of giving attorneys a role in that
system, were discussed at the Alaska Constitutional Convention, and that
the debate continues to this day.147 The court noted, “[t]he legal principle
Plaintiffs ask the courts to establish is in fact a change in policy that
requires amendment to the Alaska Constitution. To date, there is no
indication of any desire on the part of Plaintiffs to invoke the amendment
process.”148 That would soon change.
B. Attempts to Amend Article IV
In the 28th Alaska State Legislature, following the Ninth Circuit’s
definitive rejection of plaintiffs’ attack on Article IV of the Alaska
Constitution, and its observation that plaintiffs’ sole avenue for the
change they sought was in the amendment process, Alaska State Senator
Pete Kelly introduced Senate Joint Resolution 21 (SJR 21).149 SJR 21 sought
to amend Article IV of the Alaska Constitution to accomplish the broad
objectives of the earlier-failed litigation.150
SJR 21 initially proposed a single change to Article IV that would
dramatically alter the balance achieved by the founders. The even ratio
(3:3) between non-attorneys and attorneys specified by the Constitution
would be changed so that there would be twice as many non-attorneys as
attorneys: the governor would appoint ten non-attorneys to the Judicial
Council while the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar Association
would appoint five attorneys.151 SJR 21 was later amended so that the

145. Id. at 900.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 891.
149. S.J. Res. 21, 28th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2014).
150. The litigation sought to remove entirely the role of attorneys on the
Judicial Council by disqualifying them from membership on the Council. Kirk v.
Carpeneti, 623 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 2010). The proposed amendment, by
comparison, sought to diminish substantially the attorneys’ role on the Council—
and concomitantly expand the governor’s power—by providing a much greater
number of non-attorneys on the Council.
151. S.J. Res. 21, 28th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2014).
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number of attorneys would remain at three and the non-attorney
members would increase from three to six.152 A second change was also
proposed, prohibiting the attorney members of the Council from taking
their seats until confirmed by the legislature.153
SJR 21 was the subject of intense legislative debate. Proponents
generally attacked what they claimed was the undue power exercised by
attorneys in the selection process—some suggested that the lawyers could
“dictate” who would go to the governor—pointing primarily to the fact
that the three attorney members of the Council, plus the chief justice,
constituted a “controlling majority” of the Council.154 And a recurrent
theme was that the attorneys and chief combined to limit the number of
names being sent to the governor.155 Opponents of the measure, however,
provided testimony at several committee hearings, strongly rebutting the
claim that attorneys exercised undue influence in the process,156 but were
152. Comm. Substitute for S.J. Res. 21 (FIN), 28th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2014).
153. Comm. Substitute for S.J. Res. 21 (2d FIN), 28th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska
2014).
154. A Resolution Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Alaska
to Increase the Number of Members on the Judicial Council and Relating to the Initial
Terms of New Members Appointed to the Judicial Council: Hearing on S.J. Res. 21 Before
the S. Judiciary Comm., 28th Alaska Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2014) (Statement of Sen.
Kelly, Sponsor, at 1:58:44–2:00:30; Statement of William Clarke at 2:42:34).
155. Id. (Statement of Sen. Kelly, at 1:59:00).
156. Opponents presented the 2014 version of the chart adverted to in note 83,
above. Nancy Meade, General Counsel of the Alaska Court System, introduced a
chart entitled “Alaska Judicial Council, Voting Statistics—Applications for
Judicial Positions.” A Resolution Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the
State of Alaska to Increase the Number of Members on the Judicial Council and Relating
to the Initial Terms of New Members Appointed to the Judicial Council: Hearing on S.J.
Res. 21 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 28th Alaska Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2014)
(Statement of Nancy Meade, General Counsel, Alaska Court System, at 2:15:08).
The situation regarding voting patterns in the Judicial Council has not changed
in any material way since the legislative debates surrounding SJR 21 in 2014. In
2014, as now, over 60% of Council votes are unanimous and over 80% are
unanimous or unanimous except for one. ALASKA JUD. COUNCIL, DETAILS OF
JUDICIAL NOMINATION VOTES 1984-2018 (Sept. 2, 2018) (on file with authors). Only
1.3% of the votes are ties with all the attorneys on one side and the non-attorneys
on the other. Id. In breaking those ties, the chief voted to send the applicant’s name
to the governor nine times, and nine times not to send it on. Id. And in response
to the repeated claim that the attorneys, including the chief justice, worked to limit
the number of nominees sent to the governor, the opponents showed that, when
the lawyers and non-lawyers were evenly split, the chief justice broke ties in favor
of nominees exactly half of the time (in 9 of 18 cases). Id. And in the cases of all tie
votes (that is, including instances where attorneys and non-attorneys were on
both sides of the vote), the chief justice voted to send the name of the applicant to
the governor 75% of the time. A Resolution Proposing Amendments to the Constitution
of the State of Alaska to Increase the Number of Members on the Judicial Council and
Relating to the Initial Terms of New Members Appointed to the Judicial Council: Hearing
on S.J. Res. 21 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 28th Alaska Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2014)
(Statement of Susanne diPietro at 2:17:42).
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unsuccessful in stopping its advance through all committees of referral.
But the really significant debates were largely within the membership of
the Republican majority that controlled the Senate, and out of the public
process. While successfully navigating all committees of referral,157 the
resolution was eventually withdrawn by its sponsor before floor debate
in the Senate,158 signaling that the resolution lacked sufficient support
within the party to pass the full legislature.159
The sponsors of SJR 21 introduced a virtually identical measure,
Senate Joint Resolution 3 (SJR 3), in the following Alaska State
Legislature.160 By this time, however, defenders of Article IV and the merit
selection system had organized,161 and successfully stopped SJR 3 in
committee.162 The proponents did not re-introduce any similar measures
in the 30th Alaska Legislature.

IV. EVALUATING MERIT-BASED SELECTION
A. The Challenge of Judicial Evaluation
It is difficult to quantify the practical benefits of a merit-based
selection system. Evaluating different systems of judicial selection
necessarily involves making a broader assessment about the role of the
judicial branch in American government.163 Some commentators believe
that judicial elections are desirable because they satisfy the demands of
popular sovereignty,164 even if those elections produce judges who are
157. S.J. Res. 21, Bill History, 28th Legislature, 2013/2014, available at
www.akleg.gov (last visited Aug. 26, 2018) (passed Sen. Jud. Comm. 2/28/14;
passed Sen. Fin. Comm. 3/31/14; advanced to third reading 4/4/14).
158. S. JOURNAL, 28th Leg., 2d Sess., at 2431 (Alaska 2014).
159. Dermot Cole, Fischer, Carpeneti Defend Judge Selection System at State Bar
Convention, ALASKA DISPATCHNEWS (May 13, 2015), https://www.adn.com
/politics/article/fischer-carpeneti-discuss-judge-selection-state-barconvention/2015/05/14/ (“Kelly introduced [SJR 21] in 2014, but could not line
up 14 votes in the senate to advance the plan, as Fairbanks Republican Sen. Click
Bishop opposed it at a key moment.”).
160. S.J. Res. 3, 29th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2015).
161. The opponents of SJR 21 later created a non-profit group called Justice
Not Politics Alaska to defend Art. IV and the merit selection system. About Us,
JUSTICE NOT POLITICS ALASKA, http://justicenotpoliticsalaska.org/pages/aboutus/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
162. See S. JOURNAL, 29th Leg., 1st Sess., at 584 (Alaska 2015) (representing the
last recorded action regarding the resolution, which was referral to the senate
judiciary committee).
163. Laura Denvir Stith & Jeremy Root, The Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan:
The Least Political Method of Selecting High Quality Judges, 74 MO. L. REV. 711, 712
(2009).
164. See, e.g., Federalist Society Judicial Elections White Paper Task Force, The
Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 393, 394 (2002)
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evaluated as less competent than appointed judges.165 Others argue that
an independent judiciary—one without elections—is justified by
reference to both the principles of American democracy and the
demonstrable harms of electing judges.166 As to the former principle, an
independent judiciary more closely aligns with the separation of powers
fundamental to American constitutionalism.167 As Alexander Hamilton
wrote in the Federalist No. 78, “the complete independence of the courts
is peculiarly essential” in American governance.168 On a practical level,
scholars have pointed out that popular control of the judiciary may
compromise constitutional rights,169 lead to harsher sentences for criminal

(“[J]udicial elections have substantial advantages over the alternatives not least in
that they provide an additional, significant measure of self-government to
voters.”); Ray M. Harding, The Case for Partisan Election of Judges, 55 A.B.A. J. 1162,
1164 (1969) (“Query: Is it not our political system of elective representation that
guarantees popular sovereignty? We have a tripartite system of government, the
judiciary being but one branch of a system designed to insure that all branches of
government will be responsible to the will of the governed.”).
165. See generally Stephen Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain
Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J. L., ECON. & ORG.
290, 308, 316 (2010) (pointing out that, when compared to elected judges,
appointed judges are cited more often in other jurisdictions and are typically older
and have more legal experience when they assume the bench).
166. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Evaluating Judicial Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1985 (1988).
167. See id. at 1988 (“The paramount function of courts is to protect social
minorities and individual rights. But judges cannot be expected to perform this
countermajoritarian function if their ability to keep their prestigious, highly
sought after positions depends on popular approval of their ruling. . . . Thus, I
strongly favor abolition of judicial elections in all states.”); see also Steven P.
Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 689, 726 (1995) (“[E]lective judiciaries pose two problems for the
constitutional democrat. First, the rights of individuals and unpopular minority
groups may be compromised by an elective judiciary. Second, and more mundane
but no less important, the impartial administration of “day-to-day” justice may be
compromised.”).
168. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
169. See Croley, supra note 167, at 727 (“Insofar as the outcomes of judicial
elections are dependent on majoritarian attitudes concerning individual or
minority constitutional rights, these rights may be compromised.”); see also Julian
N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1580 (1990) (“The
independence demanded [of the judiciary] must insulate the courts from the
people as well as the legislature.”).
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defendants,170 and allow moneyed interests to infect the judicial arena.171
Assessing merit-based judiciaries is further complicated in two
ways. First, comparative studies of judicial selection methods usually rely
on data collected from different states—where slight variations may exist
between nominating systems despite their common denomination as
“merit-based”—and each study uses a different method of data collection
and analysis.172 Second, there are many different ways to evaluate judicial
selection and retention using a variety of metrics, and each has its strong
supporters.173
With these considerations in mind, the success of Alaska’s meritbased system can be assessed through quantitative studies that examine
judicial selection, the historical presence or absence of corruption in state
judicial systems, and qualitative assessments of Alaska’s judiciary by
legal scholars and commentators.
B. Studies on Merit-Based Selection
Robust studies examining merit-based selection are few and far
between.174 Two scholars at the University of Alaska Anchorage’s Justice
170. See, e.g., KATE BERRY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., HOW JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
IMPACT CRIMINAL CASES 13 (2015); see also Stephen Bright & Patrick Keenan, Judges
and the Politics of Death: Deciding between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in
Capital Cases, 1995 B.U. L. REV. 793–95 (1995) (observing that judges who face
retention elections are more likely to override jury sentences to impose death);
Fred Burnside, Comment, Dying to Get Elected: A Challenge to the Jury Override, 1999
WIS. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (1999) (examining political incentives leading judges to
override jury sentences).
171. Chemerinsky, supra note 166, at 1988 (“[P]ublic disclosure of campaign
contributions means that judges can know who donated both money for and
against them. There will be the inevitable suspicion that certain judicial votes were
influenced by the dollars spent in the election campaign.”).
172. Rebecca Mae Salokar et al., The New Politics of Judicial Selection in Florida:
Merit Selection Redefined, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 123, 124 (2006); see also Ryan Fortson &
Kristin S. Knudsen, A Survey of Studies on Judicial Selection, ALASKA JUST. FORUM,
Summer/Fall 2015 at 1, 9 (“[E]ach state handles its judicial selection differently.
This underscores the need to compare the different selection methods.”).
173. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology, Judicial Selection and Judicial
Ethics, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 643 (1989) (describing different methods of
evaluating judges); see also Fortson & Knudsen, supra note 172.
174. G. Alan Tarr, Commission-Based Judicial Appointment: The American
Experience, 41 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT 239, 263 (2011) (pointing out that both
critics and proponents of merit-based selection have failed to develop a modern,
comprehensive set of empirical research); see also Antonia Moras, A Look at Judicial
Selection in Alaska, ALASKA JUST. F., Fall 2004, at 9, 11 (“Beyond the [Alaska Judicial]
Council’s own research, little evaluation of the Alaska selection and retention
processes has been done, and there seems to be a need for additional formal
examination of their patterns and history to see how the framework has held up
over the last four and a half decades.”); cf. Fortson & Knudsen, supra note 172, at
10 (“There have been few empirical studies of selection method effects on trial
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Center, Ryan Fortson and Kristin Knudsen, published a survey of studies
on judicial selection in response to the Alaska legislature’s consideration
of SJR 3 in 2015.175 These studies, according to the Justice Center, “are
illustrative of the variety of approaches taken to evaluate the impact of
selection methods on the quality of judicial performance.”176 Taken
together, these studies highlight several desirable features of Alaska’s
merit-based judicial selection process, as well as the potential dangers of
modifying it.177
Fortson & Knudsen first point to a study conducted by Salokar, et
al.,178 which examined the effects of a 2001 Florida state law that gave the
governor “substantially greater power in appointing members of
[Florida’s] judicial nominating commissions”179 and “reduce[d] the
influence of the state bar association.”180 The Salokar study is particularly
probative for two reasons. First, the study examined both the composition
of Florida’s judicial nomination commissions and the political orientation
of individuals applying for and appointed to judgeships, rather than
looking at just one or the other.181 Second, the Salokar study looked at
these data before and after a change in Florida’s judicial selection system
that was similar to the proposed Alaska constitutional amendment.182
Florida has multiple judicial nomination commissions—one for each
circuit and appellate court—resulting in twenty-six total commissions.183
Before 2001, three commissioners had to be lawyers appointed by the
Florida Bar Association; three commissioners were appointed by the
governor (and could be lawyers or non-lawyers); and the remaining three
commissioners had to be non-lawyers and were selected by the six other
commissioners.184 Florida voters approved changing this system in 2001
so that the governor appoints four members from a list of names
submitted by the Florida Bar Association but can reject the list and ask for

judges.”).
175. See generally Fortson & Knudsen, supra note 172.
176. Id. at 1.
177. Fortson & Knudsen took no position on the desirability of Alaska’s meritbased judicial selection process. They provided a number of studies but did not
advocate for any particular judicial selection process. Thus, any advocacy that
makes reference to Fortson & Knudsen comes from the authors of this article.
178. Salokar et al., supra note 172.
179. Forston & Knudsen, supra note 172, at 7.
180. Salokar et al., supra note 172, at 123–24.
181. Id. at 128, 130.
182. Id. at 124.
183. Id. at 125.
184. Id. at 124–25.
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a new one.185 The other five members are appointed entirely at the
discretion of the governor, though at least two must be lawyers.186
This change, according to Salokar, shifted Florida’s judicial selection
process “away from the collaborative bar-governor process, which has
been the hallmark of merit selection, to a system closer to a gubernatorial
appointment process.”187 After 2001, both the commissions themselves, as
well as the judges ultimately appointed to the bench, aligned more closely
with the political party of the governor (Republican at the time).188 The
commissioners
selected
under
Florida’s
new
system
are
“overwhelmingly” Republican, accounting for 86.9 percent of overall
appointees.189 This political alignment was true both of the applicants for
the governor-appointed commission positions and of applicants
recommended by the Florida Bar.190 Those appointed by the governor
were nearly entirely Republican (98.2%) and none were Democrats.191
Party affiliation bias also carried over to the judges selected.192 The
number of judges registered as Republican increased from 61 percent to
77 percent. Moreover, judicial applicants increasingly listed in their
application prominent Republican politicians as personal references193
and openly advertised their affiliation with Christian Right social
organizations.194
Salokar’s study demonstrates that giving more power in the judicial
selection process to politically elected leaders results in an increasingly
politicized judiciary.195 As Fortson and Knudsen put it, “[i]f a handpicked screening committee assists the governor, it is reasonable to
conclude that it will select nominees first for compatibility with the
administration’s political, ideological, and religious views, then will
narrow the pool based on merit and experience.”196
185. Id.
186. Id. at 126.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 128.
189. Id. at 129.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 134 (“The transformation was even more striking on the appellate
courts. Before the reforms, only 54.5 percent of the governor’s eleven
appointments to the district courts of appeals were Republicans, but following the
reform, all nine (100 percent) were registered Republicans.”).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 138. Alaskan commentators expressed concern that modifying the
Alaska Judicial Council to give the governor greater control over its composition
would similarly inject religiosity into the bench. See, e.g., Barbara McDaniel,
Secular Arguments to Change Judicial Council Mask Religious Agenda, ALASKA
DISPATCH NEWS (Feb. 25, 2016).
195. Id. at 138–39.
196. Forston & Knudsen, supra note 172, at 9.
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Beyond the Salokar study, there is very little research that analyzes
changes in the composition of the judiciary in response to greater
gubernatorial control over nominating commissions.197 Other papers
analyzing judicial selection largely focus on the broader comparison of
judicial election versus appointment.198 Nevertheless, studies that
highlight the differences between election and appointment are helpful
when evaluating Alaska’s merit-based system as they serve as proxies for
comparing more- and less-independent judicial systems.
Studies comparing appointment and election systems indicate that
both citizens199 and corporate litigants200 report high satisfaction in
jurisdictions that have appointment systems. Voter satisfaction with
judges may be reflected in the vote in judicial retention elections.201 In the
2016 retention elections—the most recent for which full statistics are
available at the time this article was written—33 judges were up for
retention.202 Alaska voters retained all 33, with the percent voting to retain
ranging between 57.5 percent and 75 percent.203 At least one commentator
has observed that “the vote in favor of retention [in Alaska] is typically
between 60 and 75 percent of the total. This is evidence of the generally
high caliber of Alaska’s judges.”204 Moreover, Alaska’s experience with
retention elections is consistent with retention elections from other states.
A 2007 study of retention elections in ten states showed the mean
percentage of affirmative votes for retention consistently in the high 60s
to mid-70s.205
197. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Mattias Iaryczower, Garrett Lewis & Matthew Shum, To Elect or
Appoint? Bias, Information, and Responsiveness of Bureaucrats and Politicians, J. PUB.
ECON. 230 (2013).
199. See HARRISON, supra note 71, at 98. (observing high affirmative vote
percentages in Alaska’s judicial retention elections).
200. UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, RANKING
THE STATES: A SURVEY OF THE FAIRNESS AND REASONABLENESS OF STATE LIABILITY
SYSTEMS 20–21 (2017), https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/pdfs/
Harris-2017-Executive-Summary-FINAL.pdf (ranking Alaska’s trial judges
second in impartiality and fourteenth in competence according to a survey of
corporate lawyers and executives).
201. See Fortson & Knudsen, supra note 172, at 9 (“One possible measure of the
success of the judicial selection process is through voter satisfaction with judges
as reflected in the vote in judicial retention elections.”).
202. ALASKA JUD. COUNCIL, 1976-2016 RETENTION VOTE HISTORY (2016), available
at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/sites/default/files/imported/retention/
retvotes16.pdf.
203. Id.
204. HARRISON, supra note 71, at 98.
205. See Larry Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends 1964-2006, JUDICATURE,
March–April 2007, at 208, 208–13; cf. Albert J. Klumpp, Alaska’s Judicial Retention
Elections: A Comparative Analysis, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 143, 152 (2017) (noting that
Alaska’s retention levels are historically lower than other retention states).
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Measures of performance other than voter approval also highlight
potential advantages of appointment systems. For example, judges in
appointment systems are more-often cited by other courts and law
reviews,206 suggesting that appointed judges author more persuasive
opinions. And appointed judges are disciplined by judicial disciplinary
councils less often than are elected judges,207 suggesting that appointed
judges more closely adhere to norms of professional conduct while
serving on the bench.
C. Assessment of Merit Selection/Retention of Judges
One way to assess the merit system for selection and retention of
judges is to assess the functioning of the judicial system itself. If the
system functions well, the system for selecting judges can be said to be a
good one. While there are certainly other actors besides judges who affect
the overall functioning of the judicial system, responsibility in Alaska for
its performance rests primarily with judicial officers, as administrative
direction of the Alaska Court System is vested in the chief justice.208
Moreover, appointment of the administrative director to supervise the
administrative operations of the judicial system, who serves at the
pleasure of the chief justice, is done only with the approval of the Alaska
Supreme Court.209 Beyond these administrative responsibilities, of course,
it is judges, at all levels, who make the decisions upon which the judgment
of the effectiveness of the judicial system largely depends.
We conclude that the Alaska judicial system has functioned
extremely well during its 60-year history. We reach this conclusion based
on two complementary analyses. First, the absence of historical evidence
of corruption or malfeasance in the history of the Alaska judiciary.
Second, the judgments of several legal professionals from across a broad
spectrum who have come to regard the Alaska judiciary as a national
leader.

206. See Choi et al., supra note 165, at 315 (“Our results are largely consistent
with the hypothesis that judges subject to less partisan pressure write higher
quality—more frequently cited—opinions.”).
207. MALIA REDICK, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDGING THE QUALITY OF JUDICIAL
SELECTION METHODS: MERIT SELECTION, ELECTIONS, AND JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE 5–6
(2010), available at http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/
Judging_the_Quality_of_Judicial_Sel_8EF0DC3806ED8.pdf.
208. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 16.
209. Id.
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1. Absence of Corruption
In contrast to the unhappy experiences of many other states,210 the
Alaska judiciary has, during its 60-year history, avoided corruption and
scandal. A review of Alaska’s history since statehood reveals no example
of judicial corruption: no bribery, no payoffs, no other scandals. As
Thomas B. Stewart, the Secretary of the Constitutional Convention and a
primary architect of the Constitution, wrote in 2004:
Alaska is fortunate to have the constitutional guarantee of the
merit system for the selection of judges. Our merit system has
worked well in Alaska. It has produced high quality judges with
integrity and abundant skills, and it has kept out corrupting
political influences that trouble other states.211
Ten former Alaska attorneys general, who had been appointed
by governors from across the political spectrum, highlighted the
absence of corruption in the history of the Alaska judiciary in urging
the legislature to reject SJR 3. They wrote: “Almost uniquely among
the states, Alaska’s judiciary has been free of the taint of corruption
and scandal that has plagued so many other state judiciaries.”212
Editorial comment has also noted the absence of problems
encountered elsewhere. During debate on the issue whether the governor
had the right to demand more nominees from the Judicial Council, the
Anchorage Daily News defended the merit system in these terms: “The
wisdom of the constitutional framers has been demonstrated again and
again. The system works. . . . Neither partisanship nor cronyism nor
political pandering has ever gotten a firm grip on Alaska courts . . . .”213
Charlie Cole, Attorney General of Alaska from 1991 to 1994, wrote
in opposition to SJR 21 in 2014, that popular election or partisan
appointment systems in other states had “too often created judiciaries

210. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431 (2004)
(documenting hundreds of instances of judicial misconduct); CYNTHIA GRAY, AM.
JUDICATURE SOC’Y, A STUDY OF STATE JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE SANCTIONS 167 (2002),
available at https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Center%
20for%20Judicial%20Ethics/Publications/Study-of-State-Judicial-DisciplineSanctions.ashx (pointing to hundreds of instances of judicial misconduct in the
United States, but only two in Alaska).
211. Thomas B. Stewart, Judicial Merit System Best for Alaskans, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 26, 2004, at F2.
212. Letter from Ten Former Alaska Attorneys General to Alaska legislators
(Dec. 8, 2015), http://justicenotpoliticsalaska.org/uploads/3/7/6/8/37689611
/letter_from_former_alaska_attorneys_general.pdf.
213. Editorial, Murkowski Overreaches, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 5, 2004,
at H2.
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tainted by corruption, cronyism, bias, and mediocrity, if not outright
incompetence.”214
2. Professional Assessment
The judgments of others, especially legal professionals from both
outside and inside Alaska, lend strong support to the conclusion that
merit selection has created a highly functioning judicial system.
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, who has reviewed all of the opinions of
the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court of Appeals each year
since 2003, and who has addressed the combined Alaska Bar and bench
at their yearly conference since 1990 on Alaska constitutional opinions,
had this to say recently about the experience:
It is an enormous pleasure each year to read all the Alaska
published opinions so as to go through this process. As I say
each year, I come away from that experience absolutely
convinced that in Alaska you have the very best appellate judges
of any state in the country.215
Dean Chemerinsky has also expressed this sentiment to a broader
audience. In his 2014 book The Case Against the Supreme Court, Dean
Chemerinsky wrote that Alaska’s system “has truly been a merit-selection
process and has produced courts with excellent judges.”216 He stated
further that “the Alaska Judicial Council sees its task as identifying those
who will be outstanding judges, without regard to their political party or
ideology,”217 and praised the “high quality” of judicial opinions issued by
the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court of Appeals.218 After
briefly comparing Alaska’s judicial selection process with those found in
other states, Chemerinsky concluded that “the best selection process is
one that truly emphasized merit, and Alaska’s has succeeded in this
regard.”219
When the question of Alaska’s merit selection system was debated
broadly in 2015 with the introduction of SJR 3, ten of Alaska’s former
214. Charlie Cole, Opinion, Stacking Alaska Judicial Council Would Be a Mistake,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Mar. 12, 2014), https://www.adn.com/commentary/
article/compass-stacking-alaska-judicial-council-would-be mistake/2014
/03/13/.
215. Videotape: Erwin Chemerinsky, Alaska Appellate Law Update, Address
at the Alaska Bar Convention (May 23, 2016) (on file with the Alaska Bar
Association).
216. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 299–300
(2014).
217. Id. at 299.
218. Id. at 298.
219. Id. at 300.
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attorneys general, from across the political spectrum, spoke out sharply
against modifying Article IV. The former attorneys general jointly signed
an open letter to the Alaska Legislature that began by noting their
common perspective:
Each of us has served as Alaska Attorney General. Having seen
our judiciary system up close, we are deeply concerned by recent
efforts to amend the Alaska Constitution in a way that would
introduce politics into the selection of Alaska’s judges. We
oppose Senate Joint Resolution 3, presently pending before the
Senate, because it would weaken one of the best judicial
selection and retention systems in America.220
The former attorneys general emphasized their agreement on the
excellence of Alaska’s merit selection system despite their broad
differences in background and service:
We served Republican and Democratic governors who came
from all segments of the political spectrum. But we agree that
our Constitutional framers got it right when they created a merit
selection system that ensures that only the most qualified
judicial applicants—the “tallest timber”—will be nominated for
the governor to consider appointing to the bench.221
They concluded their open letter to the legislature with a clear call to reject
the attempt to amend Article IV: “The Alaska Constitution’s Judiciary
Article has served the state well and should not be amended. Please reject
SJR 3.”222
Even those who have advocated for changing Alaska’s Constitution
have expressed a desire to leave the merit-based selection system intact.
Former Alaska Attorney General John Havelock, who has urged the
convening of a Constitutional Convention to address what he perceives
as weaknesses in the Alaska Constitution, commented that “the Judicial
Article . . . was a triumph of reason at the [C]onstitutional [C]onvention
and has served this state well.”223 Concerning the balance struck by the
framers regarding judicial selection, Havelock concluded that “there
seems to be no compelling reason” to change the balance of power
between the governor and the Judicial Council.”224 He added that “[t]he
existing arrangement [of the Judicial Council] has presented no visible
problems and no changes seem appropriate.”225
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Letter from Ten Former Alaska Attorneys General, supra note 212.
Id.
Id.
JOHN HAVELOCK, LET’S GET IT RIGHT 88 (2012).
Id. at 86.
Id.
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Looking to a 60-year history that is devoid of any significant
problems, and to the considered opinions of legal professionals of all
political persuasions, both inside and outside Alaska, we conclude that
the merit selection system has succeeded in creating and sustaining an
independent and competent judiciary.

V. CONCLUSION
The delegates to Alaska’s Constitutional Convention understood
well the tension between an independent judiciary and popular
sovereignty. The delegates sought to balance these tensions by creating
the Judicial Council, evenly divided between attorneys, who would know
well the abilities of their fellow attorneys, and lay members, who would
represent the broader public, to find the best qualified candidates to
nominate for appointment. The delegates then provided for the choice
among the best qualified to be made by the governor, recognizing that
elections have consequences. Finally, the delegates provided for the
people to have the final say, after a suitable period on the bench for the
new judge to develop a record.
The delegates above all wished to assure that the new state would
have a judiciary that was independent of the other branches of
government, that would render fair decisions based on the law, and that
would be free of political influences and considerations.
Article IV has survived challenges both in court and in the
legislature. And, as the Alaska Constitution begins its seventh decade,
merit selection has been widely recognized as the best vehicle to assure
the continued excellence of the Alaska judicial system.

